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ABSTRACT
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an
important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate gover-
nance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are
more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance
should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a
source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied
to firm performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Based on several critical but heretofore uncorrelated develop-
ments in financial markets, this Article calls for a fundamental
change in the governance of systemically important firms.1 Tradi-
tional corporate governance views a firm’s managers as acting pri-
marily on behalf of the firm’s shareholders.2 Only in very limited
circumstances do managers have a duty to others, such as cred-
itors.3 Shareholder primacy effectively obliges managers to engage
the firm in risk-taking in order to make profits.4
Although that risk-taking can cause externalities, they are usu-
ally minor.5 This changes, however, when the risk-taking causes
“systemic” externalities—such as the failure of a systemically im-
portant firm,6 which triggers a domino-like collapse of other firms
1. See infra note 6 and accompanying text (describing systemically important firms).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 7 (11th ed.
2014) (“A smart and effective manager makes decisions that increase the current value of the
company’s shares and the wealth of its stockholders.”). By “manager,” this Article means the
most senior managers who have ultimate responsibility to manage the firm, such as a
corporation’s directors.
3. Managers of an insolvent firm, and perhaps also of a firm that is in the “vicinity of
insolvency” or contingently insolvent, should additionally take creditor interests into account.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 665-69 (1996) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to
Creditors] (expanding “insolvent” firms to those near insolvency).
4. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (explaining the shareholder-primacy
model of corporate governance). Shareholder primacy has become the dominant corporate gov-
ernance approach not only in the United States but also worldwide. See Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 443-48
(2001).
5. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1635, 1665-66 (2009) (discussing these externalities); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547, 585 n.182 (2003) (explaining that maximizing shareholder wealth can cause
negative externalities on “nonshareholder constituencies,” but “it is easy to overstate the
significance of those externalities”).
6. By “systemically important firm,” I mean a firm, such as a bank, whose failure could
trigger the type of domino-like collapse referenced in the text. Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank
Act authorizes the Financial Stability Oversight Council to also designate certain nonbank
financial firms as systemically important financial institutions, or “SIFIs,” subjecting them
to Federal Reserve oversight. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a) (2012); see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130403a.htm
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or markets, harming the real economy.7 That threat is real, as the
Federal Reserve recently observed, because shareholder primacy
“lack[s] sufficient incentives [for systemically important firms] to
take precautions against their own failures.”8
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-08 (the “financial
crisis”), regulators have been experimenting with contingent capital
regulation to attempt to harness risk-averse creditors as a check on
corporate risk-taking.9 Such regulation would require certain debt
claims against systemically important firms to convert to equity
upon specified (deteriorating) financial conditions.10 To reduce the
[https://perma.cc/UVD8-WWLW].
7. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 202 (2008). The “real econo-
my” means the economic reality, such as a recession, that people actually experience. Id. at
202 n.41.
8. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB SURCHARGE 1
(2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/gsib-methodology-paper-
20150720.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DF4-WB9V]; cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate
Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4-5, 23 (2016) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Misalignment] (explaining the relationship between that insufficiency and a tragedy of the
commons, and arguing that the law should impose a public governance duty to take systemic
externalities into account).
9. In the United States, section 115 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors to issue regulations that “require any nonbank financial company
... to maintain a minimum amount of contingent capital that is convertible to equity” when
such a company fails to meet prudential standards or the Federal Reserve determines that
threats to financial system stability make regulation necessary. 12 U.S.C. § 5325(c)(3)(A)
(2012). No regulations have yet been issued. The Financial Stability Oversight Council cur-
rently takes the position that contingent capital regulation should be “an area for continued
private sector innovation” because “[t]he United States experience with instruments similar
to contingent capital is quite limited” and there are potential concerns that could be
associated with them. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STUDY
OF A CONTINGENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 19 (2012) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/
Co%20co%20study[2].pdf [https://perma.cc/7TH7-2XEX]. However, several foreign jurisdic-
tions, including the European Union, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, have more
actively pursued regulatory initiatives in this area, see id. at 26-29, in response to
recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that global systemically important
financial institutions “should have loss absorption capacity beyond the minimum Basel III
standards, and depending on national circumstances, this additional capacity could be drawn
from a menu of viable alternatives including ... a quantitative requirement for contingent
capital instruments,” id. at 23.
10. Debt securities that are required to convert to equity securities upon certain
conditions, such as the debtor-firm’s equity capital falling below a pre-set minimum, are often
called contingent convertible securities or, more simply, “CoCos.” See, e.g., John Glover & Tom
Beardsworth, Contingent Convertibles, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (July 29, 2016, 4:31 PM),
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chance those conditions will occur, holders of the convertible debt
claims are expected to impose strict loan covenants on their debtor-
firms’ ability to take risks.11
Contingent capital regulation can be costly, however, and its
efficacy is uncertain. It is costly because debt issued as contingent
capital is riskier, and thus may be more expensive, than non-
convertible debt.12 Its efficacy is uncertain because it operates
indirectly, incentivizing holders of debt issued as contingent capital
to influence corporate governance through strict covenants.13 Strict
covenants may not always be imposed, however. Firms customarily
offer creditors higher interest rates as a quid pro quo to allow looser
covenants,14 especially if the debt is sold to the public, which makes
it difficult to later obtain covenant waivers.15 Experience shows that
http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/contingent-convertible-bonds [https://perma.cc/ S42J-
4GV7].
11. See Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt
Securities, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 136, 138 (1998) (“Restrictive covenants, such as debt or
dividend limitations, represent a common means for reducing agency costs.... [C]ovenants
control investment and financing decisions ex ante by prohibiting the company from taking
actions expected to lower a firm’s value.”); cf. Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and
Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 127 (2010) (“[A]lthough the law grants creditors no
special rights against managers, creditors can acquire substantial control powers over
corporate operations by bargaining for both positive and negative covenants.” (footnote
omitted)). 
12. See, e.g., Eric S. Halperin, Coco Rising: Can the Emergence of Novel Hybrid Securities
Protect from Future Liquidity Crises?, 8 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 15, 21-23 (2011) (explain-
ing why issuing CoCos to investors may be more expensive than issuing ordinary debt);
Christopher Whittall & Juliet Samuel, Buyer Beware: The Vulnerability of One Complex Debt
Investment, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 20, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-
beware-the-vulnerability-of-one-complex-debt-investment-1455964204 [https://perma.cc/Z57J-
VJRX] (observing “[t]he sharp drop in prices” of debt issued as contingent capital and sug-
gesting that investors may have underestimated their risks). 
13. Some contingent capital regulation, however, may have an additional argument in
favor of its efficacy: even if the stricter covenants fail to avert a default, a conversion to equity
of the debt issued as contingent capital might cure the default. Cf. supra note 10 and
accompanying text (discussing the conversion to equity). That could potentially enhance
financial stability. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
9, at 5.
14. See Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, supra note 3, at
651 n.12.
15. Kahan & Yermack, supra note 11, at 142-43 (observing that publicly issued corporate
bonds typically have only minimal covenants because of the difficulty of obtaining waivers,
if needed). As of October 9, 2015, assuming that most corporate bonds not issued under the
Rule 144A exemption from registration are publicly issued, up to approximately 87 percent
of corporate bonds appear to be publicly issued. See Bonds: FINRA TRACE Market Aggregate
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creditors usually “go for the gold,” choosing the higher rates over
strict covenants.16
Choosing higher rates over strict covenants not only reduces the
efficacy of contingent capital regulation; it also has the unintended
effect of making debt issued as contingent capital even more expen-
sive. And contingent capital regulation can have other unintended
consequences. For example, capitalizing a systemically important
firm with contingent capital in order to make the firm less likely to
fail might motivate the firm’s managers to take even greater corpo-
rate risks.17 Furthermore, because covenants are relatively inflex-
ible—any change requires a formal waiver—they can “impair[ ] the
managers’ ability to pursue value-maximizing projects, [which
would] reduce the likelihood of increases in cash-flow production
and ... enhance the risk of debtor payment defaults.”18 
This Article argues that the law could more effectively temper the
risk-taking of systemically important firms by directly engaging
shareholder primacy. One way to do that, this Article contends,
would be to require the corporate governance of those firms to in-
clude bondholders—that is, the holders of long-term corporate debt
securities (“corporate bonds” or simply “bonds”19)—in addition to
shareholders, thereby harnessing the more risk-averse bondholders
as a check on corporate risk-taking.20 This would not be a perfect so-
lution to the problem of systemic risk because bondholder interests
Information, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (Oct. 9, 2015), http://finra-markets.morningstar.
com/BondCenter/TRACEMarketAggregateStats.jsp [https://perma.cc/TK9P-BXZD].
16. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 29, 1993, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1993-03-28/bondholder-
beware-value-subject-to-change-without-notice [https://perma.cc/T5EQ-NKV2] (“Bondholders
can—and will—fuss all they like. But the reality is, their options are limited: Higher returns
or better protection [in the form of stronger covenants]. Most investors will continue to go for
the gold.”).
17. See George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 30 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2011), https://business.illinois.edu/
gpennacc/ConCap030211.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F2L-PXZC] (“A bank that issues contingent
capital faces a moral hazard incentive to increase its assets’ jump risks.”).
18. Sepe, supra note 11, at 145-46.
19. Bonds technically are long-term corporate promissory notes issued directly by firms
to investors. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 367 (6th ed. 1999). 
20. See infra Part I.C; cf. Peter O. Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, CRD IV Framework for
Banks’ Corporate Governance, in EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 155, 196-97 (Danny Busch &
Guido Ferrarini eds., 2015) (“[I]t seems that in jurisdictions which prioritize shareholder
supremacy, bank managements are indeed encouraged to take significantly more risk.”).
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are not fully aligned with the interests of the public.21 Only
something like a “public governance” duty of managers—not to
engage firms in excessive risk-taking that could lead to systemic
externalities22—could fully align those interests.23 Nonetheless,
including bondholders in the corporate governance of systemically
important firms should reduce systemic risk by reducing risk-
taking: the less such a firm engages in risk-taking, the less likely
that firm would be to fail, with potentially systemic consequences.
The rationale for proposing this fundamental change in corporate
governance is not merely its potential to reduce systemic risk. This
Article identifies two critical but heretofore uncorrelated market
changes that themselves should justify the change in governance.
First, modern financial markets have minimized the traditional
rationale for differentiating bondholders and shareholders for
corporate governance purposes. Like shareholders, bondholders
often realize their investment value not by holding onto the secur-
ities, but by selling them to other market investors.24 They therefore
view their investment decisions from a market pricing standpoint,
rather than from a priority-of-claim standpoint.25 Because that
market pricing depends on the financial condition and operations of
the firm issuing the bonds, which is determined largely through
managerial decision-making, bondholders, like shareholders, now
rely heavily on management. Second, bonds increasingly exceed
equity shares as the source of corporate financing.26
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A describes the traditional
corporate governance distinction between creditors and sharehold-
ers. Part I.B explains why modern financial markets have mini-
mized that distinction for bondholders. Part I.C then shows why
including bondholders in the corporate governance of systemically
important firms would not only be logical from a governance
21. See Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 9-10.
22. I propose and analyze such a public governance duty elsewhere. See id. at 29-56.
23. See id. at 27-28.
24. This is sometimes referred to as trading the bonds. See SHARPE ET AL., supra note 19,
at 374, 376 (describing bond trading).
25. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking the Theory
of Damages in a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1053, 1056-58 (2011) (arguing that viewing
a bond only in terms of periodic payments of principal and interest is “formalistic” and
“questionable”).
26. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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perspective, but also would help to reduce systemic risk. Thereafter,
Part II examines how corporate governance could include bondhold-
ers. To that end, Part II.A analyzes whether bondholders and
shareholders should share governance, Part II.B analyzes whether
managers should have a dual duty to both bondholders and
shareholders, and Part II.C compares these approaches.
I. SHOULD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INCLUDE BONDHOLDERS?
A. The Traditional Corporate Governance Distinction Between
Debt and Equity
Traditionally, the corporate governance distinction between debt
and equity turns on the supposition that only shareholders have a
direct stake in their firm’s future performance.27 According to that
distinction, creditors have much less of a stake because, as senior
claimants of the firm, they should be paid in full their fixed
investment plus an agreed rate of interest28 unless the firm becomes
insolvent.29 Creditors can contractually protect against the firm’s
insolvency by negotiating covenants in their loan agreements.30 The
traditional view also assumes that creditors do not trade their
claims.31 For bond markets, that assumption has historical support:
most corporate bonds used to be held by investors to maturity,32
with investors expecting to receive their value through the periodic
receipt of principal and interest payments.33 
27. See Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value,
25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1714 (2012) (explaining that traditional corporate governance
literature views equity holders as active and direct influences on managers, while creditors
remain passive participants until the firms default).
28. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 656-57 (2006).
29. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Nini et al., supra note 27, at 1714-15; Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s
Obligations to Creditors, supra note 3, at 651.
31. Cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(arguing that the “substantive ‘fruits’ [of a bond only] ... include the periodic and regular
payment of interest and the eventual repayment of principal”).
32. 2 JANE W. D’ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE: RESTRUCTURING INSTITUTIONS
AND MARKETS 124 (1994).
33. MAUREEN BURTON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS
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In contrast, shareholders are residual claimants of the firm,
holding equity interests.34 As such, they are not entitled to a fixed
return. Instead, they may look for income streams in the form of
dividends, payable from a portion of the firm’s profits.35 Sharehold-
ers also place significant value on increasing the stock price, which
enables them to sell their shares at a profit.36 Because covenants
“can never restrict or determine all the operating and investment
decisions necessary to run the firm efficiently,”37 shareholders must
rely on the firm’s management.38 
As a result, the law traditionally assigns corporate governance
rights to shareholders, not creditors. This assignment is sometimes
referred to as the shareholder-primacy model,39 in which a corpora-
tion is “organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”40 Under that model, managers have a fiduciary obli-
gation to shareholders to try to achieve and maximize profitability,
56 (2d ed. 2010).
34. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
35. Id. at 4-5.
36. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE
L.J. 439, 452-56 (2003) (observing that shareholders speculate, or at least place significant
value, on the ability to resell their stock at a profit). This resale ability is especially important
for large institutional investors, who are responsible for more than 50 percent of stock owner-
ship. See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices,
116 Q.J. ECONOMICS 229, 257 (2001). Over time, large institutional investors have also moved
towards investing in riskier stocks. See James A. Bennett et al., Greener Pastures and the
Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1203, 1204, 1223-25, 1233-36
(2003); see also id. at 1203 (observing that although institutional investors account for 50 per-
cent of stock ownership, they are responsible for 70 percent of trading volume, which suggests
that they are more concerned about stock prices than long-term dividend expectations).
37. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 352.
38. Cf. Fisch, supra note 28, at 658 (arguing that shareholders therefore have a direct
stake in the firm’s future performance).
39. The overwhelming acceptance for the shareholder-primacy model can be traced to a
debate in the 1930s between two academics, Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.
Berle argued that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation
... [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their in-
terest appears.” A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1931). Dodd, in contrast, argued that the business corporation should be viewed as “an
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function.” E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148
(1932).
40. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Milton Friedman,
The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13,
1970, at 32.
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which in turn can enhance welfare by generating jobs and purchas-
ing power.41
I next show that the traditional corporate governance distinction
between debt and equity investing has greatly diminished because
bondholders now invest with the intention of selling their bonds
before maturity. 
B. Modern Financial Markets Have Minimized that Distinction
for Bondholders
In today’s financial markets, bondholders often sell their bonds
prior to maturity and therefore, like investors in equity securities,
view their investment decisions more from a market-pricing
standpoint than from a priority-of-claim standpoint.42 In 2014, for
example, the average daily trading volume of corporate bonds
reached a record of $26.7 billion, a 50 percent increase from 2002’s
41. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 547-48, 572-73. This fiduciary relationship is
also explained as resulting from the shareholders’ legal status as “owners” of the corporation.
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5, 7. But see Fisch, supra note 28, at 650 (noting that the
fact that shareholders are owners does not address the question of whether other stakeholders
can partake in the ownership interest in the corporation).
42. Even though investors often likewise sell other types of debt securities prior to
maturity, the governance imperative should be greater for investors in bonds. For example,
investors in a firm’s asset-backed debt securities are much more likely to look to the value of
the underlying assets, which are the source of payment, rather than to the firm’s governance.
See, e.g., Andrew A. Silver, Rating Asset-Backed Securities, in INVESTING IN ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 17, 25-27 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2000) (“Analysis of the credit quality of any
structured security that is backed by assets typically begins with an assessment of the risk
in the underlying asset pool.”). Similarly, although bank loans are widely traded, their
investors are more likely to look to the protection afforded by bank-loan covenants, which are
much stronger than bond covenants. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt:
Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 656-57 (2009).
Banks are able to bargain for stronger covenants because bank loans are generally bought and
sold only between banks, making it much easier for firms to obtain waivers, if needed.
Compare Sandeep Dahiya et al., Bank Borrowers and Loan Sales: New Evidence on the
Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 76 J. BUSINESS 563, 565 (2003) (observing that the bank-loan
investor community is limited to banks), with Kahan & Yermack, supra note 11, at 150-51 (ob-
serving that bonds have minimal covenants because of the difficulty of obtaining waivers).
Bank lending has also become much less significant than bonds as a source of U.S. corporate
financing. See infra note 61 (observing the fall of bank lending to 10 percent of corporate debt
financing). Outside of the United States, however, firms sometimes rely more on bank loans
than bonds to raise financing. SIFMA RESEARCH, U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS DECK 7-8 (2015),
https://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589956851 [https://perma.cc/6G9J-F7AR] (dis-
cussing European Union and Japan firms).
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average trading volume of $17.8 billion.43 That same year, the aver-
age turnover rate for corporate bonds, computed as bond trading
volume as a percentage of total outstanding, was 86.0 percent.44
That effectively means that the amount of bonds traded almost
equaled the amount outstanding—a turnover rate approximately
twice that of equity securities.45
Mutual funds, foreign investors, and insurers—investor classes
that currently hold almost two-thirds of outstanding U.S. corporate
bonds—account for most of this increase in bond trading.46 Since the
1980s, for example, there has been a stark increase in mutual funds’
investments in bonds.47 In contrast to insurance companies and
pension funds, which often “buy and hold” bonds, mutual funds
actively trade their bonds and view their investments from a
market-price standpoint.48 In part, this reflects that mutual funds
must periodically sell bonds in order to pay fund-investors redeem-
ing their shares.49
The incentives of bond investors thus more closely parallel the
incentives of equity investors: both types of investors now invest in
their respective securities with the primary intention of re-selling
them, and the resale price of both types of securities is tied to firm
43. SIFMA RESEARCH, U.S. BOND MARKETS TRADING VOLUME, https://www.sifma.org/
research/statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/BD79-C7Z7] (last updated Feb. 3, 2017). Besides a
slight dip in trading volume during the financial crisis, the volume of corporate bond trades
has steadily increased. See id.
44. I calculated 86 percent using the $26.7 billion average daily turnover rate for
corporate bonds, see id., times 252 trading days per year, divided by $7,826.0 billion corporate
bonds outstanding, see SIFMA RESEARCH, ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING U.S. BOND MARKET,
https://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z224-SW52] (last updated
Feb. 13, 2017).
45. Itay Goldstein et al., Investor Flows and Fragility in Corporate Bond Funds 8 (June
25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2596948 [https://perma.cc/
5MDW-BHK6] (concluding that bond investors trade their securities more frequently than
equity investors).
46. Nabila Ahmed & Sonali Basak, The $3 Trillion Bond Trade Citigroup Says Investors
Should Fear, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2015, 8:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-06-10/a-3-trillion-traffic-jam-is-seen-looming-in-credit-by-citigroup [https://perma.cc/
6GGD-TLME].
47. Bruno Biais & Richard C. Green, The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th
Century 45 (IDEI, Working Paper No. 482, 2007), http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/
wp/2007/bondmarket.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HJZ-3GMP].
48. Goldstein et al., supra note 45, at 2-3, 7-8.
49. See Ahmed & Basak, supra note 46.
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performance. Bond investors and equity investors thus both have a
direct stake in that performance.50 
C. Corporate Governance Should Include Bondholders
The fact that bondholders now have a direct stake in their firm’s
performance suggests that corporate governance should take
bondholders’ interests into account. One might nonetheless counter
that a longstanding corporate governance model, shareholder
primacy, should not be altered merely to benefit a single class of
creditors.51 There are, however, two additional reasons for including
bondholders in corporate governance: bonds have become the
principal source of corporate financing, dwarfing equity issuances;
and including bondholders would help to reduce systemic risk.
1. Bonds Have Become the Principal Source of Corporate
Financing
The shareholder-primacy model originated during the 1930s,52
when the equity markets far outshadowed the size of the corporate
bond market.53 That dominance of equity appears to be one of the
justifications for shareholder primacy.54 In recent years, however,
50. This contrasts with the traditional view that only shareholders have a direct stake in
their firm’s future performance. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text. I later observe
that because bondholders do not have as much of a direct stake in their firm’s future
performance as shareholders, bondholders’ inclusion in governance should be less than that
of shareholders. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
51. That counterargument would be more compelling if there were a mechanism to give
bondholders more protective covenants, because bond covenants are relatively weak. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text. One such mechanism, beyond the scope of this Article,
would be the “super trustee” idea advanced in Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450-51 (1999) (arguing that such a
trustee could represent the interests of the bondholders with authority, among other things,
to renegotiate covenants).
52. See Berle, supra note 39, at 1049; Dodd, supra note 39, at 1147-48.
53. See, e.g., Biais & Green, supra note 47, at 1 (stating that in the 1930s, the corporate
bond trading volume “was between one fifth and one third of the trading volume in stocks”).
54. Cf. A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1367-68, 1370 (1932) (observing that “[p]robably half the entire savings of the
country are now represented by passive property” in the form of shares of stock, and that
corporate shareholding “directly affect[s] not less than half of the population of the country”).
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there has been a radical shift in the relative amount that bond
investors and equity investors put at risk.
Bonds have now become the “principal source of external financ-
ing for U.S. firms,”55 dwarfing equity issuances.56 In 2014, for ex-
ample, newly issued corporate bonds raised approximately $1.49
trillion, compared to only $175 billion (that is, $0.175 trillion) raised
by newly issued shares of stock.57 Since 2006, new corporate bond
issuances have exceeded new issuances of equity by more than
eight-fold.58
Moreover, today’s bond-market dominance of corporate financing
is unlikely to be temporary.59 At least part of the reason for the
55. Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets: Transparency and the Corporate
Bond Market, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2008, at 217, 217-19; cf. Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang
Wang, The Integration of Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond Markets, 28 J. BANKING &
FIN. 299, 302 (2004) (observing the shift of corporate debt markets “from a bank liquidity
orientation to a capital markets orientation”).
56. This compares the proceeds of newly issued corporate bonds and equity shares,
excluding any increase of balance sheet equity resulting from retained earnings—the portion
of a firm’s net income (primarily built up through income from operations) that is retained by
the firm rather than being distributed to shareholders as dividends. The reason for this
exclusion is that categorizing retained earnings as equity is an accounting convention; even
the retained net income of a firm financed primarily by debt would be categorized as equity
under that convention. Any comparison between debt and equity proceeds is inherently
imprecise, however, because debt securities have fixed maturities whereas equity securities
are generally coterminous with the firm’s existence.
57. See New Security Issues, U.S. Corporations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm [https://perma.cc/
XAV4-CYQT] (last updated Jan. 27, 2017).
58. Between 2006 and 2015, newly issued corporate bonds raised approximately $14
trillion, while newly issued equity raised about $1.7 trillion. See generally New Security
Issues, U.S. Corporations: Release Dates, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/corpsecure2016.htm (use dropdown
menu to access data from different years) (collecting bond and stock issuance data for 2006
through 2015).
59. Even if that bond-market dominance were temporary, the diminishing distinction be-
tween debt and equity securities calls into question equity’s control of corporate governance.
Cf. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309,
1311 (2008) (noting that “with the right package of derivatives, a debtholder can enjoy the
same cashflow rights as an equityholder and vice versa.... As financial innovation has acceler-
ated over the past two decades, the terms ‘shareholder’ and ‘debtholder’ or ‘creditor’ have
become less meaningful”). Professors Baird and Henderson thus argue that privileging “equity
and the rights of equityholders in corporate law ... is now completely out of step with modern
finance.” Id. at 1342; see also Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder:
Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193,
216-217, 221 (2005) (“[W]ith the rise of more complex funding instruments the traditional dis-
tinction between debt and equity fails to accord with economic reality and looks artificial,
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increase in bond financing is the costs saved by disintermediation,60
making bond financing often less expensive than bank financing.61
Of even greater relevance, bond financing is less expensive than
equity financing. In transaction costs alone, there is a cost saving.
On average, a firm making an initial public offering of stock pays
about 11 percent of the proceeds in expenses,62 and even a seasoned
issuer of stock pays about 7 percent in expenses.63 In contrast, a
firm issuing bonds pays on average just over 2 percent of the
proceeds in expenses.64 Even aside from transaction costs, bond
financing is less expensive than equity financing. Tax law, for
example, typically allows firms to deduct the interest paid on their
debt as a business expense but does not permit them to deduct the
dividends paid on their stock.65 Bond financing also avoids diluting
the equity interest of shareholders.66
Furthermore, the costs of bond financing are continuing to de-
crease. Greater technology, information exchange, and transparency
are stimulating the bond market by reducing information asymme-
arbitrary and increasingly passé.” (quoting Jennifer Hill, Public Beginnings, Private Ends—
Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders, 9 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 21, 27
(1998))).
60. Disintermediation refers to “getting rid of the banking middle man.” Stanley Pignal,
Companies Get Rid of the Banking Middleman, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d5f6780-2d5e-11e1-b985-00144feabdc0.html [https://perma.cc/W3FR-
GCBT]. Bond financing is a direct form of disintermediation; securitization is an indirect form.
61. See Silvio Contessi et al., Bank vs. Bond Financing Over the Business Cycle, ECON.
SYNOPSES (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), Nov. 15, 2013, at 1-2, https://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/13/ES_31_2013-11-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF5S-
9T2A] (observing that, as a share of total credit market instruments, corporate bonds rose
from 37 percent in the 1980s to 58 percent by 2013, whereas the share of bank loans fell from
26 percent to less than 10 percent during that same period). They also observe that the rise
of institutional investors and corporate bonds coincides with the diminishing traditional
relationship between banks and borrowers. Id. Another reason why bank financing dimin-
ished in relative importance was that unregulated finance companies could lend more cheaply
than banks. D’ARISTA, supra note 32, at 274; see also Whitehead, supra note 42, at 654
(discussing the costs of bank regulatory compliance).
62. See Inmoo Lee et al., The Costs of Raising Capital, 19 J. FIN. RES. 59, 62 tbl.1 (1996).
63. Id. 
64. Id. Although the differential between the transaction costs of a bond offering and an
initial public offering/seasoned equity offering generally decreases relative to the size of the
offering, bond financing is less expensive than equity financing at all size levels. See id. 
65. Samuel David Cheris, Note, Stockholder Loans and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 22
STAN. L. REV. 847, 851 (1970). 
66. See id.
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try and enabling prices to more accurately reflect credit quality,67
even on a real-time basis.68 This is increasing the bond market’s
attractiveness to institutional investors. As more institutional
investors buy bonds, the bond market becomes larger and more
liquid,69 thereby further reducing funding costs.70
2. Including Bondholders in Corporate Governance Would Help
to Reduce Systemic Risk
Another important reason for including bondholders in corporate
governance is that, being more risk averse than shareholders,
bondholders could help to reduce a firm’s systemic risk-taking. In
the world of bond trading, as explained below, the reason why
bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders goes beyond the
traditional view (associated with holding bonds to maturity) that a
bondholder is only entitled to principal and interest and therefore
does not benefit from the firm’s profitability. Instead, bondholder
risk aversion is more closely tied to bond ratings.
A bond’s rating signals the issuing firm’s creditworthiness71 and
therefore is critical to the bond’s trading price.72 The rating agency
67. See Bessembinder & Maxwell, supra note 55, at 232 (observing that in 2002 the
TRACE system introduced transaction price reporting for corporate bond trades, resulting in
increased transparency in a previously murky market); see also Whitehead, supra note 42, at
655, 658-59. Greater competition and the growing loan sales market also made “long-term
[banking] relationships with borrowers less valuable.” Id. at 656. 
68. Whitehead, supra note 42, at 677.
69. “Liquid” in this sense refers to an investor’s ability to sell bonds to another investor
for an attractive price.
70. D’ARISTA, supra note 32, at 12-13 (noting that secondary markets for securities
complement long-term financial markets by providing “flexibility for investors in long-term
financial assets and help[ing] minimize the risk of changes in financial and economic condi-
tions”). The cost comparison in the text accompanying supra notes 62-66 does not compare
bond funding costs (the rate of return firms must pay as interest on their bonds) with the
equivalent for shares (presumably the rate of return firms must pay as dividends on their
shares).
71. See, e.g., Understanding Moody’s Corporate Bond Ratings and Rating Process, SPECIAL
COMMENT (Moody’s Investor Service, New York, N.Y.), May 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Moody’s],
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/eeSpecialComment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8VH-R8N6] (“Moody’s bond ratings are predictions of relative creditworthi-
ness.”).
72. See Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s
Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411,
412-13 (1990) (“[B]ond rating services are popular with investors because they can rate
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providing the rating, such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s,
typically monitors the firm issuing the rated bond.73 If the firm’s
creditworthiness remains stable, the bond rating should be pre-
served.74 But if the firm’s creditworthiness declines, the bond rating
could be downgraded,75 causing the bond to fall in value.76
Although theoretically a firm whose creditworthiness increases
should see an upgrade in its bond rating,77 that seldom happens in
practice. For example, Moody’s reports that in an average year only
9 percent of bonds it rated investment grade78 were upgraded.79 In
contrast, just over 40 percent of such bonds were downgraded over
the same period.80 That differential holds constant for bonds rated
non-investment grade: in an average year, less than 13 percent of
those bonds were upgraded81 whereas over 60 percent of those bonds
were downgraded or had their ratings withdrawn.82
These data indicate that a bond’s trading price is more likely to
fall if the firm issuing the bond does poorly than to rise if the firm
does well, making bondholders less likely to share in the upside of
success than in the downside of failure.83 This suggests that
securities’ riskiness far less expensively than can an individual investor.”).
73. E.g., Moody’s, supra note 71, at 5.
74. See id. at 7.
75. See id. (explaining that “[i]f changing circumstances contradict the assumptions or
data supporting the current rating,” that bond will be placed “on review for possible upgrade,
downgrade, or direction uncertain”).
76. See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW.
U. L. REV. 565, 578 (1995).
77. See Moody’s, supra note 71, at 7.
78. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets]
(explaining “investment grade” as ratings on debt securities of BBB- and above, indicating
that full and timely payment is expected).
79. Moody’s, supra note 71, at 11 exhibit 8.
80. Id. (reporting data for the period 1970-2001). During that same period, U.S. GDP
increased by an average of over 3 percent annually. See U.S. Real GDP Growth Rate by Year, 
MULTPL.COM, http://www.multpl.com/us-real-gdp-growth-rate/table/by-year [https://perma.cc/
D8P7-CQSJ]. That statistic in an expanding economy suggests that the differential between
rating downgrades and upgrades may be even larger in a static or declining economy. Also
note that of the “just over 40 percent” of bonds being downgraded, approximately half are
downgraded to another investment grade and half are either downgraded below investment
grade or have their ratings withdrawn. See Moody’s, supra note 71, at 11-12.
81. Of these upgraded bonds, less than 1 percent are upgraded to investment grade; the
remainder are upgraded to merely another non-investment grade rating.
82. See Moody’s, supra note 71, at 11 exhibit 8.
83. This means that bondholders do not have as much of a direct stake in the firm’s future
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bondholders should be more risk averse than shareholders, not
wanting their firm to take risks if those risks carry a realistic
chance of the firm failing even if the expected value of such risk-
taking to the firm is positive.84 Including bondholders in corporate
governance should therefore help to reduce systemic risk by making
systemically important firms less likely to engage in risk-taking. 
For example, consider a systemically important firm with BBB-
rated (investment grade) bonds85 that is contemplating investing in
$100 million of highly leveraged but high interest rate mortgage-
backed securities that have (only) a 10 percent chance of defaulting.
The anticipated rate of return on the mortgage-backed securities
should increase the firm’s profitability. However, in the event of
those securities defaulting, assume the rating on the bonds will be
downgraded below investment grade. Shareholders may find the
investment attractive because it is likely to be profitable. But
bondholders may have a different perspective. As empirical data
indicate, the anticipated profitability is unlikely to result in an
increase in the bonds’ credit rating.86 Therefore bondholders have no
upside from the firm’s contemplated investment. On the other hand,
they face a 10 percent chance of losing value in their bonds.
Bondholders are therefore likely to oppose the investment.87
For these reasons, the corporate governance of systemically
important firms should include bondholders if the benefits of such
inclusion are likely to exceed its costs.88 Part II next examines how
performance as shareholders. I am not arguing, however, that bondholders should be included
in the firm’s governance to the same extent as shareholders. See infra Part II.C.
84. Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 27, 44-45 (1996); cf. In the Eye of the Bondholder, ELECTRIC PERSP., Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 22, 23 (“Equity analysts can take some risk, even some volatility, because they can see an
upside. Bondholders, wary of risk of default on debt, want to keep things slow and steady.
Equity analysts want to be made rich. Bondholders want to be made whole.”); George S. Corey
et al., Are Bondholders Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 974 (1991)
(explaining that if a firm moves from low- to high-risk projects, the value of its bonds will
decrease).
85. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 78, at 7 (defining “invest-
ment grade”).
86. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
87. Furthermore, the gap between bondholder and shareholder perspectives on the in-
vestment may widen as the risk of default increases, so long as shareholders find the risk of
default acceptable.
88. Any actual cost-benefit analysis of including bondholders in corporate governance
should offset any costs saved by substituting for the existing government policy requiring
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that inclusion could occur. The principal cost would be that the
same bondholder risk aversion that helps to reduce systemic risk
might also reduce profitability.89 To minimize that potential cost,90
Part II will assume that even though bonds now exceed equity as a
corporate financing source, bondholders should have a minority say
in their firm’s governance except when governance decisions could
significantly harm them.91 
II. HOW COULD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INCLUDE BONDHOLDERS?
There are at least two ways to include bondholders in corporate
governance. Part II.A examines a direct approach in which
bondholders and shareholders share governance (the “sharing-
governance” approach). Thereafter, Part II.B examines an indirect
approach in which managers have a duty to both bondholders and
shareholders (the “dual-duty” approach). Finally, Part II.C compares
these approaches. 
minimum levels of convertible contingent debt; such debt can reduce profitability by imposing
stricter loan covenants on the firm’s operations. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (observing that because bondholders would
not share in the upside of success as much as would shareholders, bondholders would be less
likely to be interested in the firm taking risks to profit); see also Van Der Weide, supra note
84, at 44-45. Van Der Weide posits a firm with $1 million of debt facing two investment
opportunities: “Project Alpha, providing a fifty percent probability of a $2 million return and
a fifty percent probability of a $1 million return; and Project Beta, providing a fifty percent
probability of a $3 million return and a fifty percent probability of a $500,000 return.” Id. at
44. He concludes that bondholders will prefer that the firm pursue Project Alpha because it
guarantees that the firm will be able to repay debt. Id. By contrast, shareholders will prefer
that the firm invest in Project Beta because it “maximizes the expected value of shareholder
gains.” Id.
90. Another potential cost is that including bondholders in corporate governance might
make them less likely to bargain for and enforce indenture covenants. Cf. Amihud et al., supra
note 51, at 455 (noting that “covenants ... entail costs,” including “the costs of enforcing”
them).
91. That assumption is also partly supported by the fact that bondholder claims are
protected to some extent by covenants. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50 (2008). But cf. ARENT LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN
PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION 64-65 (1977) (arguing in the political science
context that when a state has major internal divisions and none of the divisions is large
enough to form a majority group, successful democracy requires proportional representation);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 281 (2006)
(arguing that when firms elect chief executive officers bondholders should have the right to
vote, and discussing a proportional allocation of voting power between bondholders and
shareholders).
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A. The Sharing-Governance Approach
The precedents for sharing governance focus on allowing different
constituencies—which in this Article would be bondholders and
shareholders—to elect management representatives.92 The constitu-
encies would thus share governance by communicating their
interests to their representatives.93 
In the United States, the most applicable precedent for minority
sharing of governance is the preferred shareholder model, discussed
in this Part. Preferred shareholders who are not paid scheduled
dividends have the right to elect one or more directors to the
board.94 Outside the United States, the most applicable precedent
appears to be the German co-determination model, in which
employees have the right to elect certain directors to the supervisory
board.
92. Bondholders should be prohibited from contracting away this right of election. If they
could contract it away, some bondholders might try to do so in exchange for a higher interest
rate. Cf. supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing bondholders bargaining for
higher yield in lieu of protective covenants). If systemic risk considerations were not involved,
that negotiated tradeoff would be fine. But here there are systemic externalities that should
limit free contracting. Freedom of contracting is not, and should not be, absolute. Government
should be able to limit it in at least three scenarios, including on the basis of statutory
policy—the policy here being to limit systemic risk—and also when the contracting causes
externalities. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 520-21 (1999). In the latter case, the key question is which
externalities should count in limiting that freedom. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58-59 (1993) (raising that question). Although there is no general
answer to that question, see id. at 59-61 (explaining that different value judgments have
different implications for answering that question), systemic externalities should certainly
count in limiting freedom of contract because they not only harm the public, who cannot
contract to protect themselves, but also cause much more harm than nonsystemic extern-
alities, such as widespread poverty and unemployment, see Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra
note 8, at 16-17.
93. Bondholders, for example, should communicate their interests as bondholders. This
might present potential conflicts if an investor is both a bondholder and a shareholder of the
same firm. To resolve similar conflicts that arise in voting on bankruptcy reorganization
plans, Congress gives bankruptcy judges flexibility to disqualify the votes of investors who do
not vote in good faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012).
94. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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1. The Preferred Shareholder Model
Preferred shares, sometimes called “compromise securities” be-
cause they have both equity and debt characteristics, are contractu-
ally based shares that usually have specified rates of return and, in
a liquidation of the firm, have priority of payment over common
shares of stock.95 If expressed in their contract with the firm,
preferred shareholders enjoy contingent voting rights to elect a
minority of directors if the firm fails to pay dividends that achieve
the specified rate of return.96 
Because of that minority representation, preferred shareholders
“rarely prevail over common shareholders” in a dispute.97 Nonethe-
less, the diversity provided by preferred shareholder representation
on the board, just like that which could be provided by bondholder
representation on the board, can provide perspectives that the board
will find valuable. In a deliberative governance process, minority
representatives may persuade others to change their minds, thus
resulting in better long-term decision-making.98
95. 3 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 18:4,
Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016).
96. Id. § 18:12. Companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are mandated to
guarantee such voting rights for preferred shares after failure to pay dividends for at least six
quarters. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00(C), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCM/
sections (follow “Section 3” hyperlink; then follow “313.00 Voting Rights” hyperlink). Preferred
shareholders’ rights and remedies depend on the express and implied terms of their contract
with the firm. 11 CAROL A. JONES, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 5295 (rev. vol. 2011).
97. Melissa M. McEllin, Note, Rethinking Jedwab: A Revised Approach to Preferred
Shareholder Rights, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 895, 905. McEllin also observes that there is
a “current trend of favoring fiduciary duties owed to the common shareholders over contrac-
tual obligations owed to the preferred shareholders,” id. at 898, and that the “solely contrac-
tual preferential rights of preferred stockholders are ... very limited,” id. at 915.
98. See Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2103 (2010). Compare Antony Page,
Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 252
(finding that even supposedly “independent” directors “are members of the board of directors
and ... are likely to be biased in favor of other directors”), with William B. Stevenson & Robert
F. Radin, Social Capital and Social Influence on the Board of Directors, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 16,
17 (2009) (discussing factors that make individual directors more influential than others in
the boardroom).
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2. The German Co-Determination Model
Employees in all large German firms have the right to elect half
of the members of their respective supervisory board of directors.99
Shareholders maintain a voting majority, however, because the
chairman of the supervisory board, who is elected by and account-
able to shareholders, has the decisive vote in the case of a dead-
lock.100
Although their minority voting power has raised concern that em-
ployee board representatives merely have a consultative function,
the actual impact of employee representation on corporate decision-
making is unclear.101 Many have criticized employee representation
as being inefficient, potentially paralyzing the board’s decision-
making.102 A leading comparative law scholar counters, however,
that although co-determination “may delay such decisions ... it does
not prevent them.”103 Moreover, co-determination is believed to help
curb corporate risk-taking because, in contrast to shareholder focus
on dividends and profit, employees are concerned with their firm’s
survival in order to protect their employment.104
3. Assessment of the Models for Sharing Governance
The preferred shareholder model and the German co-determina-
tion model face two main criticisms. First, minority voting power
may constrain the minority representatives to merely consultative
roles. Second, the misaligned interests of heterogeneous manage-
ment representation creates inefficiencies. The sharing-governance
approach could be designed to avoid both these criticisms.
99. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 445.
100. See STEEN THOMSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MECHANISMS
AND SYSTEMS 195 (2008).
101. See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for
Derivatives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1230-32 (2012).
102. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 445-46.
103. Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance External-
ities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 188 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe
eds., 1999).
104. See THOMSEN, supra note 100, at 197.
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Although bondholders in the sharing-governance approach would
elect only a minority of management,105 the bondholders’ representa-
tives need not, and in the circumstances explained below, should
not, be constrained to a merely consultative role. Instead, manage-
ment decisions that could significantly harm bondholders—a
determination that could be made on a case-by-case basis by the
bondholders’ representatives—should require some form of super-
majority voting.106 For example, consent of at least one or more of
the bondholders’ representatives should be needed to approve a
transaction that, if unsuccessful, would be likely to cause the firm’s
bond rating to be downgraded. Absent this requirement for super-
majority voting, the shareholders’ majority representatives should
be able to outvote the bondholders’ minority representatives,
thereby avoiding a paralysis of board decision-making.107 
B. The Dual-Duty Approach
Next I will examine whether managers should have a duty to both
bondholders and shareholders. Because that duty would be filtered
through managerial discretion, it would be less direct than if
bondholders actually communicated their interests to representa-
tives.
The most applicable precedent for a dual-duty approach is the
insolvency model, discussed below in Part II.B.1. Managers of
insolvent, and possibly also of contingently insolvent, firms owe a
duty not merely to shareholders but also to creditors. A related
precedent, discussed in Part II.B.2, is the “public governance” dual
105. Cf. supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (assuming that bondholders should not
necessarily have even an equal say with shareholders in their firm’s governance).
106. Cf. Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America:
Majority Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 895, 896, 919 (1996) (observing that “the inherent conflict between protecting the rights of
the minority while allowing the democratic majority to rule has been used to justify
implementation of voting ... supermajority”).
107. Compare the tie-breaking power of the chairman in German corporations. See supra
notes 99-100 and accompanying text. In the United States, another way to try to alleviate
potential deadlock would be to have a lead director who facilitates discussion, serves as a
liaison with other directors and corporate officers, and chairs board meetings. See
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LEAD DIRECTORS: A STUDY OF THEIR GROWING INFLUENCE AND
IMPORTANCE 3 (2010), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/assets/lead-director-survey.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJ8-7YF7].
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duty to both shareholders and the public, which I have separately
argued should apply to managers of systemically important firms.108
1. The Insolvency Model
Managers of a solvent firm owe a fiduciary duty primarily to
shareholders, as the firm’s residual claimants.109 When a firm
becomes insolvent, managers switch their primary duty to creditors,
who become the firm’s senior residual claimants.110 The insolvency
model becomes more relevant to analyzing this Article’s dual-duty
approach, however, when a firm is not actually insolvent but merely
in the so-called “vicinity of insolvency.”111 The firm’s managers are
arguably then required to consider a “community of interests,”
which includes both the shareholders and creditors.112 Managers are
not required to prioritize one group over the other; instead, they
must maximize value for the entire corporate enterprise.113 That
approach to balancing potentially conflicting shareholder and cred-
itor interests parallels this Article’s balancing of potentially
conflicting shareholder and bondholder interests.
In that context, the insolvency model reveals that a dual duty
poses two critical questions: When does the duty arise? How do
managers balance the duty in their decision-making? In the
insolvency context, the duty would arise when a firm enters the
vicinity of insolvency because that is when creditors could be
impacted.114 In the context of this Article’s dual-duty approach, the
108. See generally Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 23-28.
109. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101-
02 (Del. 2007).
110. See id. at 102; Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
111. See Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, supra note 3, at
669-72.
112. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991
WL 277613, at *26 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
113. See Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of
the Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239, 241-42 (1992) (citing Credit Lyonnais,
1991 WL 277613, at *26). Although shareholders of a firm in the vicinity of insolvency can still
bring derivative claims against directors, creditors have the right to bring derivative claims
only in actual insolvency.
114. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1492-94 (1993) (discussing how creditors
of insolvent firms could be impacted).
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duty should arise, by analogy, when a management decision could
significantly harm bondholders—the same test that would trigger
a supermajority voting requirement under the sharing-governance
approach. In the context of the sharing-governance approach, this
Article has proposed that the bondholders’ representatives would
determine, on a case-by-case basis, when that test is triggered.115
Because the dual-duty approach does not contemplate bondholders’
representatives per se, any manager subject to the dual duty should
have the right to determine (again, on a case-by-case basis) when
the test is triggered. 
The question of how managers should balance a dual duty in their
decision-making remains unsettled in the insolvency context.
Normatively, however, I have argued that managers of a firm in the
vicinity of insolvency should protect creditors from harm unless the
overall benefit to shareholders is expected to considerably outweigh
the harm (or there is some other compelling reason to favor
shareholders).116 This balancing also follows a weak form of the
precautionary principle,117 which requires “a margin of safety” to
demonstrate that a potentially systemically risky activity is justif-
ied.118 Because part of the justification for the dual-duty approach
is to reduce systemic risk by harnessing the more risk-averse bond-
holders as a check on corporate risk-taking,119 managers making a
decision that could significantly harm bondholders should likewise
favor bondholders unless the overall benefit to shareholders is
expected to considerably outweigh that harm or there is some other
compelling reason to favor shareholders.120
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. See Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, supra note 3, at
664, 678, 697 (noting that managers should have the latitude to make their own good faith
weighing of benefit and harm).
117. Although precautionary principles have been mostly applied in assessing environ-
mental regulation, they also can apply to financial regulation. See, e.g., JAMES SALZMAN &
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 16 (2d ed. 2007); Saule T.
Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U.
L. REV. 63, 84 (2012) (“[A]dopting and operationalizing the general concept of precaution in
the context of post-crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a worthwhile, and even
necessary, exercise.”).
118. See Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (2003)).
119. See id. at 36-41.
120. See id. at 22 n.112.
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2. The “Public Governance” Dual Duty
As mentioned, managers of systemically important firms ideally
should have a dual duty: to shareholders to maximize profits, and
to the public to control systemic externalities. This public gover-
nance dual duty (hereinafter “public governance” duty) is less
specifically applicable to this Article than the insolvency model
because bondholders, like creditors in the insolvency model, are
identifiable stakeholders, whereas the public is a more diffuse
concept of a stakeholder.121 Nonetheless, certain practical questions
that are engaged in discussing the public governance duty can
inform this Article’s dual-duty approach.122
For example, how should a dual duty be created?123 In the public
governance duty context, courts could judicially create such a duty
or legislatures could amend corporation laws to require such a duty.
To the extent the dual-duty approach is legislated, that could (in the
United States) be done “either by state legislatures (especially the
Delaware legislature, because most domestic firms are incorporated
under Delaware law) or by the U.S. Congress.”124 State legislatures,
however, would not want to impose a dual duty to bondholders and
shareholders if it could discourage firms from incorporating in their
states;125 requiring managers to try to balance that dual duty might
discourage some firms who see that as increasing potential director
liability.126 Furthermore, to the extent that dual duty is imposed to
reduce systemic risk, it addresses a national problem. The “internal-
ization principle” recognizes that regulatory responsibilities should
generally be assigned to the unit of government that best internal-
121. See id. at 21-26, 22 n.112.
122. In the public governance duty context, I analyzed the following questions which are
applicable to this Article: how should a public governance duty be legally imposed; and
weighing the goals of protecting the public against systemic externalities and encouraging the
best people to serve as managers, to what extent should managers performing their public
governance duty have the protection of the business judgment rule as a defense to liability.
See id. at 23-26.
123. This discussion is based in part on Part III.B.1 of id.
124. Id. at 29.
125. See id. at 29-30.
126. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 75 (2014) (observing that “systemically important firms might be expect-
ed to incorporate away from jurisdictions adopting a [director] liability rule”).
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izes the full costs of the underlying regulated activity.127 That would
be Congress.
Another relevant question considered in the public governance
duty context is the extent to which managers performing that duty
should have the protection of the business judgment rule as a
defense to liability.128 Under the business judgment rule, managers
making business decisions, including risk-taking decisions, are
protected from personal liability for negligent decisions made in
good faith and without conflicts of interest—and in some articula-
tions of the business judgment rule, also without gross negligence.129
Even in a public governance duty context, I concluded that manag-
ers should be protected by the business judgment rule, so as not to
discourage the best people from serving as managers and to avoid
requiring courts to exercise inappropriate discretion, among other
reasons.130 I nonetheless questioned whether that protection should
be modestly weakened because the interest of a manager who holds
significant shares or interests in shares, or whose compensation or
retention is dependent on share price, has a conflict of interest in
favor of the firm’s shareholders.131 Managers with a dual duty to
bondholders and shareholders would, if they hold such equity
interests or receive such equity-based compensation, have a similar
conflict of interest.132
127. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 137 (2010); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Who
Should Authorize a Commuter Tax?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 233 (2010). The internalization
principle’s rationale is that government entities will have optimal incentives to take into
account the full costs and benefits of their regulatory decisions only if the impacts of those de-
cisions are felt entirely within their jurisdictions. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM
46-47 (1972).
128. This discussion is based in part on Part III.B.5 of Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note
8, at 39-43.
129. See Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 257-59 (2014). But
cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) (“[G]rossly negligent
conduct, without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in
good faith.”).
130. Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 40-41.
131. See id. at 41-43 (observing that the business judgment rule assumes that managers
have no conflict of interest).
132. See id. at 39-42. This assumes the norm that managers do not also hold significant
amounts of the firm’s bonds. Cf. Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FINANCE 75, 76
(2011) (observing the “long-standing belief that, empirically, executives do not hold debt”).
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Because of that conflict, I argued that managers performing a
public governance duty should in fact be subject to a gross negli-
gence standard, requiring them to use at least slight care.133
Conflicted managers whose duty is to both bondholders and
shareholders should likewise be subject to that requirement.134 As
I explained in the public governance duty context, that requirement
would not require courts to exercise inappropriate discretion
because courts routinely review whether other types of actions are
grossly negligent.135 And that requirement should not discourage the
best people from serving as managers because it would be consistent
with the business judgment rule’s actual application in such leading
jurisdictions as Delaware.136 Even though Delaware does not
formally articulate a gross negligence standard as part of its rule,137
it disallows business judgment rule protection for managers who act
in “bad faith,”138 which is broadly defined as including conduct that
“is known to constitute a violation of applicable positive law,”139
which in turn is interpreted to include a manager failing to take
“steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy” such a violation.140
A manager’s failure to use even slight care when assessing the
manager’s legally mandated duty to both bondholders and share-
holders would appear to be bad faith under those interpretations.
These answers—that the dual-duty approach might need to be
created on a federal level and that managers performing that duty
should have the protection of the (theoretically but not practically
modified) business judgment rule—should also inform the sharing-
governance approach.
133. See Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 42-43.
134. See id. at 41-43.
135. See id. at 42-43.
136. See id.
137. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006).
138. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explain-
ing that “[t]he presumption of the business judgment rule creates a presumption that a
director acted in good faith” and that “[t]he good faith required of a corporate fiduciary
includes ... duties of care and loyalty”), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
139. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., No. 14725, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *11 n.2 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (unpublished portion of opinion).
140. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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C. Comparing the Approaches
Finally, compare the sharing-governance approach with the dual-
duty approach. The sharing-governance approach would offer bond-
holders a more direct voice in management than the dual-duty
approach. Although that voice would usually be a minority represen-
tation capable of being outvoted, it would have veto power when a
management decision could significantly harm bondholders. Under
the dual-duty approach, all managers would have a duty to consider
bondholder interests. Although the primary duty of managers would
usually be to shareholders, that duty would shift (as in the voting-
power shift under the sharing-governance approach) when a
management decision could significantly harm bondholders.
Both approaches thus face the same practical threshold question:
When could a management decision significantly harm bondhold-
ers? Under the sharing-governance approach, the bondholders’
representatives would make that determination. Under the dual-
duty approach, any manager could make that determination. In
making their determination, the relevant managers might consider,
for example, whether management is contemplating a transaction
that could be profitable but, if unsuccessful, would be likely to cause
the firm’s bond rating to be downgraded. In analyzing that, those
managers would presumably take into account rating-agency
criteria for downgrading bond ratings.141 So long as they use at least
slight care in this process, the managers should be protected by the
business judgment rule.142
Once it is determined that a management decision could signifi-
cantly harm bondholders, the sharing-governance approach would
require supermajority voting in which the bondholder minority rep-
resentatives could exercise veto power.143 For those same manage-
ment decisions, the dual-duty approach would require managers to
141. Cf. RICHARD S. WILSON & FRANK J. FABOZZI, CORPORATE BONDS: STRUCTURES AND
ANALYSIS 226 (1996) (observing that these criteria include a “deterioration in the [bond]
issuers’ credit fundamentals with a concomitant increase in default risk”). Downgrades may
also result from an “increase in default risk due to ... ‘special events’ ... [such as] ‘management
actions which result in a leveraging of company financials following treasury stock purchases,
leveraged buyouts, or acquisitions financed through borrowings.’” Id.
142. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
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favor bondholders unless the overall benefit to shareholders is
expected to considerably outweigh the harm to bondholders (or there
is some other compelling reason to favor shareholders over bond-
holders).144 That balancing under the dual-duty approach would
require managers to exercise discretion, which can create uncer-
tainty.145 In exercising that discretion, however, managers would
again be protected by the business judgment rule so long as they use
at least slight care.
Both the sharing-governance approach and the dual-duty
approach should therefore be feasible. Because the sharing-gover-
nance approach would be simpler and involve less managerial
discretion, it would appear to be procedurally preferable.146 On the
other hand, the dual-duty approach might provide more flexibility
for profit-making because, as articulated, it would allow a firm to
engage in a project that could significantly harm bondholders so
long as the overall benefit to shareholders is expected to consider-
ably outweigh the harm to bondholders.147
CONCLUSION
This Article rethinks the shareholder-primacy model of corporate
governance, arguing that bondholders, who are more risk averse
than shareholders, should be included in the governance of systemi-
cally important firms. The inclusion of bondholders not only could
144. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text. For examples of this type of expected
value calculation and balancing, see Schwarcz, Misalignment, supra note 8, at 36-41.
145. Compare Kahan, supra note 76, at 613 (“[A] fiduciary duty to bondholders ... would be
vague and create great uncertainty as to whether a given action would violate it or not. As a
result, the duty would be difficult to enforce and would likely result in significant litigation
costs.”), with Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413,
446 (1986) (arguing that directors already have fiduciary duties to different classes of share-
holders and regularly consider and resolve conflicts between the two classes, so extending
fiduciary duties to creditors may not result in a detrimental increase in uncertainty and
chaos).
146. Another possible advantage of the sharing-governance approach is that managers
might not always take their dual duty to bondholders seriously. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (noting that decisions of a board of directors “will not
be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose”).
147. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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help to reduce systemic risk but also is merited by two crucial
changes in the bond markets.148
In contrast to the past century, bond issuances have dwarfed
equity issuances as the source of corporate financing for more than
a decade.149 Bondholders, therefore, often have more invested in
firms than shareholders. Moreover, bondholders—like sharehold-
ers—now typically trade their securities instead of holding them to
maturity. That ties bond prices to the firm’s performance. Therefore,
bondholders, like shareholders, also have a vested interest in that
performance.
It therefore is logical to include bondholders in corporate gover-
nance if that could be done without impairing legitimate corporate
profit-making. This Article examines two ways to accomplish that:
by enabling bondholders and shareholders to directly share govern-
ance, with shareholder representatives having voting control except
as needed to protect bondholders from significant harm; and by
requiring a firm’s managers to balance a dual duty to both bond-
holders and shareholders. Both approaches should not only have
lower costs but also more effectively reduce systemic risk than post-
crisis regulatory experiments to try to harness bondholder risk
aversion through the forced issuance of contingent capital.150
148. Because bondholder interests are not fully aligned with the interests of the public,
including bondholders in corporate governance could not eliminate systemic risk. See supra
notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory efforts to require
systemically important firms to issue contingent convertible bonds).
